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SCOTLAND AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 
Andrew Scott 
Introduction 
There can be few who remain unaware that the European Communities 
(EC) is now entering the final phase of the internal market programme. This 
programme, launched in 1985 with the publication ofthe Commission's White 
Paper "Completing the Internal Market"(!), comprised almost 300 individual 
pieces of legislation which, when implemented, will establish a truly "common 
market" between the Community's twelve member states. Consequently, 
from the 1st January, 1993, all forms of national discrimination which have 
hitherto constituted a barrier to the free movement of goods, services, capital, 
and labour across member states will have been abolished. According to the 
European Commission, completing the internal market will pay a substantial 
dividend to the Community's economy. In 1988, the Commission published 
the results of a study headed by Paolo Cecchini(2) which suggested that 
completing the internal market would, over the medium term, create some 1.8 
million new jobs across the Community, add 4.5 percentage points to 
Community GDP, and reduce the average level of EC prices by around 6%. 
At the same time, the study argued that completing the internal market would 
improve Europe's external trading position, particularly in the vital area of 
high technology products where there is clear evidence that Community 
producers have been losing ground in world markets to their Japanese and 
American rivals(3). 
Although the findings of Cecchini and others point to gains accruing to the 
Community as a whole, much less attention has been paid to assessing how the 
gains from the internal market will be distributed between the different 
regions of the Community. In particular, there is a clear concern that the 
already weak regions of the Community will be further disadvantaged as 
producers (re )locate their activities closer to the centre of the newly completed 
internal market. As Begg<4> notes, the European Commission, in their 1985 
White Paper, acknowledged this possibility: 
"The Commission is ... conscious that there may be risks that, by 
increasing the possibilities for human, material and financial services to 
move without obstacle to areas of greatest economic advantage, existing 
discrepancies between regions could be exacerbated and therefore the 
objective of convergence jeapordized." 
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As a small, open economy located on the periphery of the Community, 
there is an obvious risk that Scotland may be adversely affected by the 
emergence of a single Community market. In this chapter we consider just how 
acute this danger is. In Section Two we sketch the content of the internal 
market programme and examine the adjustment mechanism that underlies the 
Commission's estimates of the benefits. Section Three assesses the regional 
implications of the internal market programme, examining in as much depth as 
is presently possible. the potential impact upon the Scottish economy. In 
Section Four we focus on the role which public policy might play in the light of 
our analysis. Finally, in Section Five, we offer some tentative conclusions. 
Completing the Internal Market: Some Conceptual Issues 
It is by now well known that the aim of the internal market project is to 
remove the remaining physical, technical, and fiscal barriers that restrict the 
movement of goods, services, capital, and labour within the Community. 
Physical barriers refer mainly to the added costs that traded goods must absorb 
as a result of the administrative delays regularly encountered at border 
crossings, and to the inconvenience to EC residents from customs checks as 
they move across the Community. Technical barriers to trade comprise a host 
of different national policies that restrict the access of products, or factors of 
production, originating in one member state to the domestic market of 
another. Chief amongst these are national regulations defining minimum 
product standards and different certification procedures; preferential public 
procurement policies; non-recognition of professional qualifications; controls 
on the provision of services - such as transport, banking and insurance - by 
non-nationals; and controls on the intra-area mobility of capital. Finally, 
under the heading of fiscal barriers is the impact that differential indirect tax 
rates (i.e. Value Added Tax) have on intra-EC trade. The attempt to establish 
a broadly uniform rate of VAT within the Community reflects the 
Commission's view that widely differing VAT rates will be untenable given 
that the border posts which presently ensure that imported products are taxed 
according to the rate applying in the destination country are set to disappear. 
Should VAT rates throughout the Community not be approximated (a small 
degree of variation is posible), then cross-border shopping would inevitably 
reduce the tax revenue accruing to countries applying above average VAT 
rates. 
Of course, the objective of establishing a common market in the 
Community is nothing new, this being expressly provided for in Article 2 of the 
1958 Treaty of Rome. And whilst the original motive for West European 
economic integration was that it would lay the foundations for political 
unification between the participating countries, it remains the case that 
substantial economic gains are commonly associated with this type of 
arrangement. Free trade ensures that consumers benefit by having access to 
the lowest cost supplier in the area, while over the longer term costs of 
production are expected to fall as firms increase the scale of their operation at 
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the expense of the less efficient producers. Moreover, should the average cost 
of production for firms operating in the common market fall, their competitive 
position in global markets will also improve. At the same time the 
Iiberalisation of intra-area capital and labour mobility will ensure that factors 
of production are allocated where their returns are highest. Assuming that 
factor returns are proportional to the value which individuals place on the 
output they produce, unregulated factor mobility must raise the level of 
welfare across the common market as a whole. The outcome is an area in which 
prices are lower, employment is higher, and the rate of economic growth 
greater, than would otherwise be possible. 
The objective of the internal market programme is to promote the 
economic prosperity of the Community by unlocking these supply-side 
adjustments. But if the gains associated with a common market are so high, 
then one must ponder as to why it has taken the EC over thirty years to 
complete this arrangement. The answer, of course, lies in the transition 
problems that particular countries (or regions) are likely to experience as they 
open their markets to foreign competition. For it is undeniable that the 
corollary of exploiting the gains from integration by the mechanisms described 
is a change in the geographic distribution of economic activity throughout the 
area. In a perfect world, this should create no long term difficulties. The 
removal of trade barriers will, assuming they were effective, result 
immediately in imports displacing some part of domestic output. However, as 
domestic exporters will now enjoy easier access to foreign markets, the 
resources freed by import competition should speedily be absorbed by the 
expanding export industries. In short, as the textbooks tell us, free trade 
enables countries, and regions, to specialise in the production of those 
commodities, or services, in which they have a 'comparative advantage'. But, 
unfortunately, textbook stories are seldom applicable to the real world. 
There are profound problems with the conclusions of orthodox trade 
theory when applied to the mature, industrialised economies of the European 
Communities. The assumption that a clearly defined national, or regional, 
comparative advantage exists over a wide range of economic activities 
(manufacturing and services) is explicitly rejected by contemporary trade 
theorists. Because the bulk of trade between industrial economies comprises 
of imports and exports of similar, and thus competing, products, the 
distribution of activity following the removal of trade barriers will depend 
substantially upon the relative competitiveness of individual enterprises, and 
less on national resource endowment. And given that free trade enables the 
most competitive firms to increase the scale of their operations as they capture 
markets from less efficient producers, then assuming that unit-costs and so 
prices fall as their scale of production rises, it is easy to see how the initial 
distribution of sectoral competitiveness between nations prior to adopting a 
free-trade policy will be crucial in determining their longer term fortunes. The 
upshot is that where technical conditions in production dictate that a small 
number of large firms is a more cost-efficient manner of servicing the market 
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than a large number of small firms, then completion of the internal market will 
inevitably be accompanied by some element of industrial rationalisation. In 
the event of this shake-out, where 'comparative advantage' in fact means 
'competitive advantage', uncompetitive countries, or regions, will be seriously 
disadvantaged. Indeed, it was precisely this logic that persuaded many in the 
UK during the early 1970's that EC membership would serve only to expose 
the underlying competitive weakness of British industry, thereby worsening 
rather than improving our long term economic prospects. In this light, we can 
see that the notion of "adjustment" becomes highly problematic. 
First, how long will it take for a disadvantaged area, as defined, to 
restructure its economy following a change in the trading environment? In 
other words, over what time scale will any transitional problems of falling 
output and rising unemployment last? As is well known, exponents of the 
liberal tradition in economic analysis insist that this depends crucially on the 
degree of wage flexibility that prevails, as only a reduction in wages will be 
effective in attracting new investment. Ignoring the point that a low wage 
economy is not necessarily any more desirable than a low employment one, 
this view fails to recognise the importance that employers attach to the skill 
and adaptability of labour in their investment decisions. In the UK, education 
and industrial training have been amply demonstrated to be instances where, 
left to itself, the market will fail to provide an adequate supply. 
Secondly, upon which activities will the vitality of the disadvantaged 
country or region depend subsequently? If the economies of scale argument 
raised earlier is relevant, there is, in principle, nothing to prevent the 
advantaged region or country from capturing an ever larger share of output 
and employment in those sectors in which latent economies of large scale 
production reside. Although there are countervailing forces at work which will 
ultimately limit the operation of centripetal forces for any particular sector -
distance from market, internal diseconomies of scale, congestion costs, labour 
shortages, etc.- it nonetheless remains unclear as to how far the centralisation 
process will proceed before these countervailing forces come into play. 
Finally, even where an adjustment process of sorts operates, this might be 
insufficient in itself to prevent the relative prosperity of a disadvantaged 
country or region from declining. Not all types of economic activity make an 
identical contribution to the rate of economic growth. In fact, a cursory 
examination of the sectors in which intra-Community barriers to trade are 
highest, therefore where the fragmentation of the internal market is at present 
most acute, clearly shows a concentration within the high-technology, high-
growth sectors. Consequently, it is in these sectors that rationalisation, or re-
structuring, will be most pronounced after 1992. Assuming that these 
industries will prosper more in the advantaged areas than elsewhere, there is a 
distinct possibility that completing the EC internal market will widen regional 
disparities within the Community. 
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Is Scotland a Disadvantaged Region? 
The concept of a 'disadvantaged region' is, as we suggested earlier, 
inextricably linked to its competitive position. Can Scotland be construed as 
disadvantaged, and, if so, what measures can be taken to remedy this 
deficiency? Begg<5l identified six general characteristics which will influence 
the position that a region will occupy in the post-1992 'advantages' league 
table; proximity to the market centre; economic infrastructure; price and 
quality of the labour supply; the composition of regional economic activity; the 
role that the barriers to be removed at present play in sustaining economic 
activity; and the actual and potential impact of public policy measures. We 
would suggest that a seventh characteristic be added to Begg's checklist, 
namely the technological characteristics of the dominant activities within the 
region. 
The first three characteristics can be dealt with fairly briefly. In terms of 
proximity to the market centre, it is obvious that the completion of the internal 
market will increase Scotland's comparative peripherality. Producers in 
Scotland will experience an intensification of competition in both UK markets 
and elsewhere in the Community, and although transport charges form a small 
part of total production costs, at the margin they may well be important in 
determining the relative competitiveness of a range of products<6l. However, it 
is not only physical distance from the market which matters. As McKinnon and 
Hart<7l demonstrate, the quality of the transport system in terms of frequency 
and reliability of service is equally important. The clear implication is that if 
peripherality is not to become a greater burden on the Scottish economy than 
is presently the case, public policy must be directed to providing a transport 
system explicitly geared to the needs of Scotland's industry well into the next 
century. Precisely the same arguments can be made with respect to Scotland's 
economic infrasatructure, where this is defined to include the communications 
and information technology networks necessary to many modern industrial 
and service concerns. The final, purely supply-side, aspect is the role that price 
and quality of factors of production play in influencing the overall competitive 
position of a region. Recent findings suggest that of the two, it is factor quality 
rather than factor price which is crucial. O'Farrell and Hitchens<8l in an 
important and wide ranging study found that Scottish based small and medium 
sized enterprises displayed a lack of competitiveness compared to their 
matched southern English counterparts. In their explanation for this, they 
concluded: "Lack of skills and inadequate training at several levels -
managerial, intermediate/supervisory, and shopfloor- is the major proximate 
cause of the manufacturing problems." Significantly, by arguing that, "wage 
rates do not contribute in any way to variations in competitiveness between the 
two regions", they add to the suspicion which many harbour that whatever the 
regional problem is, it is unlikely to be resolved by a general reduction in wage 
rates. 
We now consider whether the present structure of the Scottish economy is 
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to our advantage or disadvantage as we approach 1992; issues four and five in 
Begg's checklist. This question was addressed in a previous study by the 
author<9l, whilst a recent study by a group of economists at the Universite 
Catholique de Louvain examined the implications of 1992 for the traditional 
industrial regions of Europe<10l. As Strathclyde formed one of the six regions 
examined by the Louvain group, their conclusions are important to our 
discussion. Finally we report the results of a study which looked at the 
potential impact of the internal market on the Scottish financial services 
sector(! I), an issue not considered in the other studies. 
In our earlier study, it was shown that by computing intra-industry 
specialisation indices, the UK economy as a whole was falling behind 
competitor EC countries as a producer in a number of the high-technology 
product groups in which intra-EC barriers to trade (especially preferential 
public procurement) are relatively high. Consequently, it is in these product 
categories - telecommunications equipment, automatic data processing 
equipment, non-electrical and electrical machinery, and chemical processes-
that the potential for rationalisation is greatest, a point that is confirmed by the 
Commission's own estimates of the cost-savings associated with larger scale 
production<12). Moreover, as these tend to be products in which the rate of 
growth in demand is above average<13l, any tendency for production to be 
concentrated subsequently outside the UK would certainly lower the long 
term growth prospects of the economy. There were, on the other hand, 
groupings in which Britain appeared strong in EC terms. These were 
pharmaceutical products, aerospace, electronic equipment, and scientific 
instruments. In at least two of these groups, electronic equipment and 
scientific instruments, there was, however, some evidence that our 
competitiveness with respect to non-Community countries was deteriorating. 
When we tum to the Scottish dimension, we note that 17% of Scottish 
manufacturing employment, accounting for one-quarter of Scottish net output 
and over one-half of Scotland's exports of manufactured products, is directly 
dependent on those high-technology sectors which not only are likely to be 
prone to rationalisation in the aftermath of 1992, but in which UK 
competitiveness appeared to be declining. 
A second observation made in that study related to the potential 
difficulties of 1992 arising from the pattern of ownership of Scotland's 
manufacturing sector. A recent STUC review of the Scottish economic scene, 
"Claiming the Future"<14), records the extent to which the branch economy 
syndrome has overtaken Scotland in the past two decades. The figures cited 
show that by the late 1970's only one-third of Scottish manufacturing 
employment was accounted for by domestically owned firms, with home 
ownership confined, in the main, to relatively small scale operations. In 
addition to the general questions raised in the report concerning the economic 
consequences of this erosion of domestic ownership and control, and the 
problems that might arise from an excessive reliance on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) for employment, there is the added risk that "branch 
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economies" may be more vulnerable to the adverse consequences of 1992-
induced industrial restructuring. Not only will the costs incurred by the closure 
of a branch plant or subsidiary be more easily absorbed by a large 
multinational corporation than a smaller, locally owned enterprise, but the 
shut-down decision itself might be taken more readily where the parent 
company can take distance from the adverse economic and political shock-
wave that follows. 
On the other hand, however, the high incidence of American and 
Japanese investment already located in Scotland may induce yet further 
inflows of overseas capital should multinational corporations fear that the 
transition to a single market will be accompanied by a rise in EC import 
barriers. In this event, as Kay05) has argued, there will be a positive pay-off for 
Scottish firms who form liaisons with non-EC firms, as they will then be better 
placed to withstand the inevitable post-1992 competitive challenge from 
French, German, and other EC-based firms. 
The Louvain study<16) also makes somewhat depressing reading from a 
Scottish perspective. The Louvain team examined the profile and recent 
economic trends for six traditional industrial regions (RETI) of the EC, 
including Strathclyde and South Yorkshire, with a view to identifying the 
adjustment problems that they might encounter in the wake of the internal 
market programme. Their report begins with a review of the present 
characteristics of RETI, and highlights the extent to which these regions have 
suffered an above EC average rise in unemployment and a lower than EC 
average rise in living standards over the past decade. The secular decline of the 
traditional industries has not been matched by a growth in new industries 
capable of soaking up the subsequent rise in unemployment, a factor that has 
been identified in other studies as contributing to the widening 'North-South' 
divide in the UK<17l. At the same time, economic recovery in RETI is 
handicapped by a number of factors; lack of diversity in their productive 
structure, technological backwardness, and a deficiency of agencies providing 
strategic advice and assistance to small and medium sized firms. The potential 
threat to RETI from the completion of the internal market arises from the high 
incidence of non-tariff barriers that presently protect their dominant 
industries. On average, some 79% of industrial employment in the six regions 
is accounted for by industries which will be affected by the 1992 programme, in 
the sense that rationalisation to exploit latent economies of scale can be 
expected, although in Strathclyde the employment dependence upon these 
sectors is even greater. Further, Strathclyde displayed an above average 
incidence of industries for which the medium term growth potential was low, 
and which were ill-suited to technological adaptation as a strategy for 
improving these prospects. 
The Louvain group<18l identified three issues which will be crucial in 
determining the regional impact of the internal market in general; technology, 
·training, and infrastructure. Regions which displayed a dynamic technological 
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profile, those with a trained and flexible labour force, and those where 
infrastructural policy was explicitly geared to 1992 stood to gain most, and 
vice-versa. On technology, the authors noted that research and development 
in RETI tended to be below the Community average. Although this was 
related to a number of factors- high incidence of typically low R&D intensive 
industries, inadequate research structures, low participation in EC technology 
policy, and few science and technology graduates - it is almost certainly true 
that the high incidence of external ownership of Scottish industry is an added 
reason for our generally poor R&D record. The importance of training and 
infrastructure are themes we have already touched upon; suffice it to say that 
the Louvain study reinforces the view that in both aspects RETI display a 
weakness when compared to the Community as a whole. When reviewing the 
contribution that EC structural funds spending has made in rectifying the 
weaknesses of RETI, the Louvain report argues that policy has tended to 
prop-up declining industries rather than encourage the development of new 
industries based on the indigenous potential of the regions. We return to the 
question of policy in the next section. 
The Holmes and Lythe study<19l investigated the post-1992 prospects for 
the financial services sector, a sector where the present barriers to intra-
Community trade are comparatively high and, consequently, where we can 
anticipate significant changes occurring. It is widely acknowledged that the 
UK financial service sector is among the most competitive in the Community, 
this being a consequence of de-regulation in the early 1980's. This has 
engendered a mood of cautious optimism that British firms stand to benefit 
most from the internal market initiative in this sector. And to a limited degree 
Holmes and Lythe share this view. They point to the openings that the internal 
market will provide for Scottish life assurance companies tu expand their 
business in mainland Europe. Herein lies an important general message for 
other firms. The competitive advantage that Scottish life assurance firms 
currently enjoy over rivals is a consequence of the expertise they have steadily 
acquired in specialised, or "niche", markets. Manufacturing firms should take 
note; a strategy based on product specialisation may, in the enlarged market, 
be a more fruitful reaction than attempting to compete across an entire 
product range. However, Holmes and Lythe also point out that banks may 
tend to favour a more central location from which to conduct certain aspects of 
their non-retail operations post-1992, raising the prospect that "headquarters 
might follow and thus leave Edinburgh"<20l. 
Taken together, the evidence reviewed here does constitute grounds for 
concern that, all else being equal, completing the internal market could well 
adversely affect Scotland's medium-term economic prospects. We now turn to 
the question of policy. Most economists would accept, even today, that policy-
makers have a clear responsibility in those instances where the operation of 
market forces alone cannot ensure that the best possible outcome is achieved. 
And there is clear evidence that market faiture is already characterising 
Scottish business in the run up to 1992. The January 1990 edition of Scottish 
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Business Insider carried the results of a survey of the views of Scottish 
management which showed that withstanding the challenge of overseas 
competition, (which will inevitably intensify after 1992), was identified as the 
main strategic objective by only 9 of the 100 respondents involved. The same 
survey showed that virtually none of the respondents considered exploiting 
technological change as a priority, while developing new markets was similarly 
discounted by the overwhelming majority as an important strategic objective. 
To this author, the research findings which have been reviewed here show that 
the 'free market' in Scotland at least is failing quite spectacularly to induce the 
appropriate response. 
A Policy Response 
It is worth emphasising that although it is our judgement that certain areas 
stand to lose upon completion of the internal market, we are neither contesting 
the proposition that gains to the Community as a whole will accrue, nor are we 
arguing that completing the internal market is necessarily a bad idea. Indeed, 
if the Community as a whole is to recover the economic dynamism that 
characterised its early years, we would accept that the 1992 programme should 
be realised in its entirety. One incontrovertible conclusion that can be drawn 
from the experience of both the USA and Japan is that access to a large 
domestic market is an important factor in determining global competitiveness 
and, consequently, general economic prosperity. At the same time, however, 
sufficient evidence exists to suggest that if the rising prosperity is to be shared 
by all, appropriate policies must be devised and implemented. 
It is unlikely that the type of regional policy favoured by national 
authorities in the past is relevant in the changed economic circumstances that 
will accompany 1992. In the first place all national policies which, either 
directly or indirectly, subsidise domestic producers in order to improve their 
competitiveness vis-a-vis partner country firms, are directly contravening EC 
competition policy. Under Article 92 member states are already constrained in 
the assistance which they may give to industry, and recent developments have 
made it clear that the European Commission intends to crack down on all types 
of financial package that may be construed as a hidden subsidy. In 1989 the 
Commission published the results of their first inventory of all types of State 
assistance to industry, clearly a prelude to further action in this area. Secondly, 
as noted in a recent review of regional policy<21 l, Jocational subsidies are 
increasingly unlikely to attract investment from high-technology firms for 
whom a skilled labour force and appropriate infrastructural facilities are the 
dominant locational considerations. Finally, the aims of UK regional policy 
have, in the past, regularly come into conflict with those of national industrial 
strategy. Frequently, resources have been diverted to industries in crisis in 
order to ameliorate regional economic imbalances. Not only has this 
effectively retarded the essential process of industrial adjustment in the UK, 
but it has served to further reinforce, rather than modify, regional dependence 
upon a narrow range of traditional, and in many instances declining, 
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industries. 
In considering how national regional policy might be framed in the light of 
1992, it is important to recall the significance that technology, training, and 
infrastructure have in determining overall regional competitiveness. In other 
words, the distribution of industry will tend to reflect the distribution of these 
supply-side elements, so crucial in the production process. Consequently, it 
would appear more appropriate that policy should be designed with a view to 
improving these aspects of competitiveness, rather than attempt to direct or 
subsidise industrial location. Not only would this be likely to encourage a 
capital inflow to the disadvantaged regions, it would almost certainly assist in 
the development of existing - and foster the emergence of new - local 
enterprises. However, the issues of policy instruments and policy management 
then become important. In their Final Report, the Standing Commission on 
the Scottish Economy<22l presented a number of recommendations designed to 
improve the competitiveness of the Scottish economy along the lines that the 
preceding analysis suggests is necessary. More significantly, the Report argues 
that not only does more finance need to be channelled into regional policies in 
the UK, but that the administrative arrangements governing the spending of 
monies have to be changed in favour of local, rather than national, control. As 
para 3.1.161 of the report puts it; "Centralised (regional) policies are bound by 
administrative inflexibilities and lack of local knowledge and are unlikely to be 
particularly appropriate". This is a conclusion with which we wholeheartedly 
concur. 
And it appears to be a conclusion that is broadly shared across the 
European Communities. Over the past five years, changes that have been 
made to EC regional and social policies, and the introduction of new policy 
initiatives, reflects a conviction that the problem of regional imbalance within 
the Community caQ only be attacked by a concerted effort to exploit the 
indigenous development potential of the regions themselves. 
In the first place, Community regional policy is developing an identity of 
its own, after almost twenty years of being firmly tied to, and constrained by, 
national regional policies. From January 1989, EC regional policy recognised 
five categories of problem region across the Community, and committed funds 
accordingly. The two main categories are Objective 1 regions, defined as 
structurally backward regions where per capita GDP is less than 75% of the 
Community avera~e, and Objective 2 regions, being those experiencing 
structural decline<2 • By the end of 1992, 80% of regional fund spending will be 
absorbed by Objective 1 regions, and 20% by Objective 2 regions. Moreover, 
this assistance is expressly designed to finance development programmes 
rather than individual projects, the aim being to enhance and exploit the 
indigenous development potential of the region<24l. Thus the new regional 
policy is important not only because it severs the link that previously existed 
between national and Community regional policy, with the latter being wholly 
subservient to the former, it also reflects a widespread acceptance of the 
40 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1991 
philosophy of integrated regional economic development founded upon a 
partnership between local, national, and Community authorities. 
Secondly the Community is promoting, via the STRIDE programme, 
what they describe as research, innovation, and technological development 
(RTD) in disadvantaged regions (particularly Objective 1 and 2 regions) 
where, as we have seen, RTD capabilities tend to be relatively weak and firms' 
perceptions of the need to innovate equally weak. RTD weaknesses are clearly 
identified as a barrier to raising the competitiveness of the disadvantaged 
regions. The STRIDE initiative, launched in 1990, is intended to complement 
a number of other EC research and development projects which have as one of 
their aims raising the competitiveness of the disadvantaged regions - for 
example, STAR (advanced telecommunications services in the regions), 
VALUE (designed to encourage the dissemination of RTD results), and 
SPRINT (promotion of innovation and technology transfer). 
Finally, the Community has taken steps to coordinate spending between 
the various funds that each have a role to play in resolving regional disparities. 
Thus the activities of the Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund, and the Guidance section of the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund are to be dovetailed in an attempt to concentrate resources 
where they can be most effective. The latter two involve expenditure aimed at 
retraining labour and combating long term, and youth, employment. 
It is evident that the Commission of the European Communities is 
attempting to get a number of policy initiatives in place ahead of, and in 
preparation for, the completion of the internal market. However, it 
nonetheless remains the case that the resources at their disposal, even after the 
decision of February 1988 to double the structural funds by 1992, are paltry in 
comparison to those commanded by national authorities. Scotland stands to 
gain little in the way of direct cash assistance from the EC structural 
programme, although quality of spending is at least as important as the 
quantity of funds available. What is more important, however, is the lead that 
the Commission is taking, and the example it is thereby setting to national 
governments, in pioneering an approach to regional policy which appears to 
stand more chance of success simply by recognising the determinants of 
regional competitiveness. 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Scotland stands to lose, at least 
in relative terms, from the completion of the internal market. Moreover, there 
is evidence to suggest that producers in Scotland are failing to treat the 
challenge of internal market with the urgency that it most certainly deserves. 
Although all regions housed within a larger area that experiences a boost to the 
rate of economic growth may benefit from "trickle-down" effects, this seems a 
rather tenuous thread upon which to hang our future economic prospects. If 
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the widely publicised gains from 1992 materialise, they will do so only on the 
basis of industrial re-structuring across the Community. This is the first threat 
to the Scottish economy. The second threat lies in the opportunities that 
Scotland's producers may miss, and others may not, by failing to develop a 
corporate strategy orientated around the Europe of the late 1990's rather than 
the late 1960's. The enlargement of the market will undoubtedly increase the 
share of the total market available for producers of specialised products, or 
those able to define "niche" markets. However, for many firms this requires 
that they devise an international production and marketing outlook, 
something that for many has never been needed before. Certainly, the 
availability and quality of advice that small and medium sized firms have easy 
access to will be important in determining whether or not these possibilities, 
and threats, are recognised. But it is not only the private firm that needs to 
adapt in the light of the 1992 programme; public policy must be equally flexible 
and responsive. We believe that there are policy measures which will improve 
the outlook for Scottish firms, indeed many of the recent initiatives taken by 
the Commission are primary examples. 
It would, of course, be wrong to imply that the public agencies in Scotland 
are doing nothing by way of preparation for 1992. All the Scottish regions have 
an internal market "unit", and one at least has for many years worked tirelessly 
to promote itself within the EC context. However, all ofthese attempts remain 
constrained by an official UK attitude which has, for many years, displayed at 
best an ambivalence towards the Communities and, in some spectacular 
instances, outright hostility. At the same time the "enterprise cult" that has 
directed the stance of public policy over the past decade may well have robbed 
Scotland of an opportunity to embark upon publicly funded ventures which 
would allow us to approach 1992 in an optimistic mood. From the periphery of 
Europe it seems that many of the other member states are involved in a giant 
game of chess, with each moving those pieces from which they expect to gain 
most strategic advantage come 1992. We, on the other hand, are still playing 
Happy Families. 
Andrew Scott, Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University. 
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